Abstract-The purpose of the Lunar Atmosphere Dust Environment Explorer (LADEE) mission was to measure the density, composition and time variability of the lunar dust environment. The spacecraft was designed with modular common structural components that could be connected together to form the spacecraft. Spacecraft components were largely chosen from "off-the-shelf" sensors, actuators and avionics. The flight software was also designed using a layered modular approach leveraging model-based design concepts. High-level spacecraft control modules were autocoded from Simulink and integrated with reused executive and services modules and a small number of new hand-coded elements such as the software to control memory scrub hardware. The successful mission launched Sept 6, 2013 and was de-orbited and impacted the moon's surface on April 18, 2014. The spacecraft had 3 primary science instruments, the Lunar Dust Experiment, Neutral Mass Spectrometer, and the Ultra Violet Spectrometer. The mission also had a Laser Communications payload that set a record download rate of 622 MPS from the moon orbit.
INTRODUCTION
The space radiation environment is made up of multiple sources as per Dyer [1] . There are at least two radiation belts around the Earth with dynamic behavior driven by solar flares and cosmic radiation. The primary outer belt is mostly composed of energetic electrons while the primary inner belt is mostly a combination of protons and electrons. The Van Allen Probes [2] recently identified additional structure and complexity in the radiation belts. The sun contributes particles during solar flares and coronal mass ejections. Cosmic rays also contribute to the radiation field seen by the spacecraft. In this case, the content tends to be mostly protons with electrons and the occasional highly energetic particle.
These various sources of radiation can have a huge impact on the stability of the avionics system of the spacecraft. In October/November of 2003 [3] , there was a series of solar storms that led to high energy particles being ejected from the sun that affected both ground and space-based systems. Multiple spacecraft entered "safemode" or otherwise required intervention by ground operators, and even the Solar Mass Ejection Imager (SMEI), designed to observe such events, experienced a day-long outage of its electronics during the third and largest of the coronal mass ejection events. The MIDORI-2 spacecraft completely failed after dropping into safemode, losing power and then telemetry. Even less dramatic space weather can induce failures in spacecraft. Bedingfield, et. al . [4] identify a variety of anomalies in spacecraft associated with ionizing radiation and solar activity.
The LADEE mission had several different phases that exposed it to each of these environments. LADEE was the first spacecraft launched on a Minotaur 5 rocket [5] , so there was no flight data available for the potential launch dispersions of the rocket. The LADEE transfer orbits were designed to be resilient against worst-case estimated 3-sigma launch dispersions while using minimal fuel for transfer into lunar orbit. The trajectory design utilized 3 phasing loops around the Earth that could be adjusted for both hot and cold launch scenarios. Each phasing loop passed through the Van Allen Radiation belts near perigee leading to a higher potential of high-energy events during a critical phase of flight. The rest of the flight was subject to normal space radiation and solar flux events. After lunar orbit insertion, the spacecraft altitude was progressively reduced to extend science measurements as close to the moon's surface as possible. The final science orbits had a periapsis between 2 and 3 km from the moons 3 surface and required frequent "Orbital Maintenance Maneuvers" to adjust the height above the moon's surface. This paper describes the software and hardware used to mitigate space radiation, and characterizes the effects of radiation on the avionics units during the different phases of the LADEE mission.
SPACECRAFT OBSERVATORY
The main science objective of the LADEE Project was to characterize the atmosphere and levitated lunar dust from lunar orbit. The orbiter carried three instruments to conduct these observations: a Neutral Mass Spectrometer (NMS) [6] , [7] , Ultraviolet Spectrometer (UVS) [8] , and Lunar Dust Experiment (LDEX) [9] , [10] . The secondary payload objective was to perform a technology demonstrations to transmit data to Earth using the Lunar Laser Communication Device (LLCD) [11] , [12] . Each of these payloads had it's own individual protection against high-energy events that will not be discussed here. These instruments required precise control of the spacecraft platform to achieve their science requirements. For that control, the spacecraft included an Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU), Star Tracker, Reaction Wheels, Propulsion system and Core Sun Sensors. Each of these instruments and sensors had various levels of resilience to radiation events, and observed events will be discussed in this report.
INTEGRATED AVIONICS UNIT
The LADEE Integrated Avionics Unit (IAU) was developed by Broad Reach Engineering [13] . It contained a 3U RAD750, which was a radiation-hardened single board PowerPC computer manufactured by BAE Systems Electronics [14] , with a compact PCI backplane with an Analog and Digital Multi-Operations Avionics Boards (AMOAB and DMOAB). The SDRAM on the DMOAB board is populated with 1024 megabytes (MiB), which was available to the processor via device drivers for use as a mass storage device. The SDRAM was configured with four separate partitions, with the available memory distributed evenly across the partitions.
The IAU was rated for a total radiation dose of ¿ 100 Krad and a Single Event Upset (SEU) rate of 1.9E-4 errors/card/day and was designed to be "Latchup-Immune". The Enhanced Power PCI bridge chip on the RAD750 board supported three types of error correction and detection, including oddparity, Single-Error Correct Double-Error Detect (SECDED) and Nibble correct for the SRAM, SDRAM and EEPROM partitions.
The RAD750 was populated with 128 megabytes (MiB) of SDRAM connected to the processor as memory. For LADEE, this memory was configured for single nibble correction and double nibble detection (Nibble Correct), where a nibble is defined as half of an 8-bit byte. The protection was applied across each 64-bit word.
The DMOAB utilized the SECDED algorithm, derived from the family of linear error-correcting Hamming Codes and applied it to each 32-bit word for its onboard SRAM and SDRAM. This is a more capable algorithm than odd-parity, which can detect only odd-numbers of bits in error, and cannot correct them. As the name implies, single-bit errors can be automatically corrected, and two bit errors can be detected and reported, but not corrected.For Flash, the DMOAB used Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR), which is a form of a majority voting scheme with two systems being able to correct and mask a fault in a third system.
Memory scrubbing was implemented in hardware and controlled by software. The hardware automatically and periodically scanned the protected memories for errors, making any errors accessible to device drivers on the processor. The memory scrub software was responsible for logging the associated Event message and triggering a write of the corrected (or replacement) data.
SOFTWARE
The Onboard Flight Software for the LADEE mission was developed using a Model-Based Software methodology. In this technique, models of the spacecraft and flight software are developed in a graphical dynamics modeling package, in this case, Simulink [15] . The models are then auto-coded to "C" and automatically wrapped with a Simulink Interface Layer that provides "publish-subscribe services" that are compliant with the Core Flight Executive (cFE) interface. These are integrated with Core Flight Services (cFS) modules and are layered on the Operating System Abstraction Layer (OSAL) [16] , [17] , all from Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC). These are further layered on VxWorks and POSIX compliant board support packages for the processor. There are a small number of custom hand-developed software units in the LADEE software suite, among them the memory scrub software.
While error detection and correction was implemented in hardware, the memory scrub software initialized and controlled the EDAC circuitry. As errors were detected by the hardware memory scan, the software device driver was notified by an interrupt. The interrupt handler would read the data that was either corrected or uncorrected by hardware and write it back to the same memory location to silence further error detections. If there were too many EDAC interrupts happening at once, then the interrupt would be disabled by the interrupt handler when the message queue was full. This was a safeguard against having the CPU hogged by the interrupt, which would cause no other task to be able to run. A command sent from the ground to Memory Scrub could reenable the interrupts when it had access to the CPU.
All event message types and memory regions were defined in the memory scrub's "action table" that could be uploaded from the ground. The table contained all known bad blocks for the memory, and identified the address ranges of each memory component. For instance, each flash, SRAM and SDRAM partition range was individually identified with a specific event identification number and the EDAC type for that partition. Event messages also be identified as informational (e.g. correctable bits), error (e.g. uncorrectable bits in unused areas of memory) and critical (.e.g. uncorrectable bits in code or data). Memory Scrub could also suppress event messages for known bad memory blocks so that there would not b3 a flood of messages being continuously telemetered to the ground. Eventually 121 separate event types were included in the table, providing a fine-grained map for memory that enhanced quick analysis of EDAC events.
The device driver time stamped the EDAC events and classified them by memory type, location and severity (correctable or uncorrectable) before sending it in a message queue for the Memory Scrub application to read. Memory Scrub would Figure 1 . EDAC events during LADEE Phasing Orbits send event messages to the ground when memory errors occurred, and the event message contained the error address and register value in addition to the information encoded in the "action table".
The ability to configure an "action table" was found to be very useful for situations when memory was damaged by a radiation hit, as the event message contained the memory location, event type and memory data. Analysts in Mission Operations could identify the criticality of the event without cross-referencing with a ground-based decoding table. In one notable event during one of LADEE's moon orbits, a bit got stuck and memory scrub was not able to clear the error for over an hour. During this period, the ground received event messages every 4 minutes, which was the DMOAB's memory scrub scan cycle. One issue with continued event messages of this sort was that they could mask or distract from other events on the spacecraft. However if the bit error didn't eventually clear on it's own, a new table would have been uploaded to suppress further event messages for that memory location. Magenta hash marks represent instances where correctable memory upsets occurred. Among the notable events on this plot, he red mark between the first and second phasing loop with the (MBE) label indicates where several SingleBit Errors (SBE) and Multi-Bit Errors (MBE) were detected in DMOAB SDram memory. Analysis of the timing and addresses of the events lead us to believe that this particular cluster of four SBEs and five MBEs was due to a single physical event. These occurred in a section of memory reserved to be used at a later time in the mission for storing instrument 5 
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Figure 2. EDAC Events for a Flux Range of ≥ 400 MeV Protons
science data, and were of no immediate consequence. For longer-term diagnosis of the viability of the memory locations, we were able to download the entire memory partition through the LLCD, and subsequent analysis of the data lead us to high confidence that the memory cells involved did not have any permanent damage.
There was a single event with the IMU early in the mission (black mark labeled IMU), indicating where we detected an error in the program memory for the IMU device. The IMU recovered from this error by reloading over the bad data from nonvolatile storage. The IMU used for this mission was not noted as being particularly rad-hard, and we felt this might indicate susceptibility over the course of the mission. As an operations policy, we minimized the use of the IMU to just critical maneuvers to limit potential damage to the device.
There are also black (ST)-labeled marks during the first and third perigee passage, indicating where our Star Tracker encountered some Low Priority events. One of these is known to have been a Correctable Memory Error, and we believe that the others are, also. From this plot, it can be seen that clusters of events occurred at the apogee of the orbit. The following figures explore that region in further detail.
Figure 2 overlays our EDAC events on an R-λ plot of the Flux range of ≥ 400 MeV Protons [18] . The figure number and title from the original document has been intentionally maintained for easy reference back to the original document. In this overlay, LADEE's three trajectories through the belts are shown as small blue dots, correctable events are displayed as large red dots. The short cyan marks indicate the perigee of each of the three orbits. Due to the age of the background image, and it's geomagnetic coordinates, this figure should be taken as only a notional alignment of LADEE's trajectory with the Earth's Van Allen Belts. This image is zoomed into the region of only the inner belt as that is where the most event upsets are expected, and indeed, where LADEE experienced most of it's upsets. Figure 3 shows similar images for a flux range of ≥ 1 MeV Protons, with a wider field of view to 7 Earth radii. It is apparent that the region of upsets is contained within the inner Van Allen Belt region rather than the outer. Figure 4 represents the Lunar Orbit Insertion process, from shortly before our first insertion burn, through a series of smaller orbits, until achieving our desired commissioning orbit. The plot is oriented roughly with the sun to the left and periselene points upward, so the craft experiences sunrise before it moves from the right to the left across the top of the plot. There were a relatively small number of events during this period of time, and no events were reported for the spacecraft sensors or actuators during this time. This was a relatively benign and short flight phase, being outside of the Earth's radiation belts and away from the moon's surface. Figure 5 represents the Commissioning and Science Orbits, commencing after lunar orbit insertion was complete and lasting through the end of the mission. After a short time in nearly circular fairly low orbit, we started the regime of orbits that place their periselene perilously near the lunar surface near sunrise. This was done to acquire science data at a range of altitudes with orbit periselene values between 2Km and 50Km being desirable for a survey of science data at different altitudes. The plot is oriented, roughly, with the sun largely off to the left, and periselene points upward, so the craft experienced sunrise before it moves right to left across the top of the plot. However, it is based on LCI coordinate data, so this relationship only holds for one specific periselene. The edac events were spread evenly around the orbits, and did not appear to be correlated with the sun's position, indicating cosmic radiation as being the primary driver. One MultiBit, uncorrectable error (Red mark) occurred during this phase, but after further investigation, it did not appear to permanently damage the avionics.
Commissioning and Science Orbits
EDAC Events as a function of memory region
Over the course of the mission, no EDAC events were reported for the Flash region of memory. As with most Flash memory, there were known bad blocks, and the action table was configured to not report any information regarding these locations. Figure 6 shows how the DMOAB SDRAM was allocated for Figure 4 . EDAC Events during Lunar Orbit Insertion LADEE. It was primarily divided into four equally sized file systems plus some small reserved areas. The size of the entire DMOAB SDRAM array was 1024 megabytes. Each of the four filesystem areas on the plot was 251 megabytes and has been identified by a different color and are listed in the legend along with the total number of events in that partition. The small reserved areas are also identified in the plot. In this figure, the linear address space is mapped onto a Hilbert curve (which is a continuous fractal space-filling curve) which in this case is mapped to a square plot. In this plot, contiguous regions in the address space appear as compact areas of color on the plot. The Hilbert curve starts at the upper left corner, and in the main proceeds counter-clockwise around the plot to end at the upper right corner. Individual EDAC events are identified by red dots.
The 155 unique EDAC reports for DMOAB memory reflect 52 distinct physical events, with 103 additional reports occurring at similar times. The additional reports differ from the initial report in only a few address bits, generally chosen from bits 11 through 17. The scale of this address space plot causes these clusters of reports to appear as a small cluster of dots, highlighting where high energy particles cascaded across a collection of memory cells, triggering a family of related EDAC events. If one considers each cluster a single event, then the events are pretty evenly distributed across the address space of the SDRAM. Only 1 EDAC event occurred in the smaller SDRAM0 partition, and none happened in the even smaller partitions or on on any of the region boundaries. Figure 7 shows errors reported for the Rad-750 SDRAM, using similar plotting methods as the previous figure. The size of the Rad-750 SDRAM array was 128 megabytes. The legend indicates the color assigned to each region of memory and the number of EDAC events observed in that region. The items in the legend window are also presented in address space order. Memory space reservations were made for VxWorks ( 16 MiB), CFE User Memory ( 16 MiB), and a Ram-based file system ( 32 MiB). The remainder ( 64 MiB) was made available to VxWorks as the system memory pool.
In contrast to the DMOAB, this plot does not display much plot point clustering: the 199 unique EDAC reports for Rad-750 memory reflect a total of 179 distinct physical events, with only 20 additional reports occurring at similar times. The additional reports differ from the initial report in only a few address bits, generally chosen from bits 12 through 14. The scale of this address space plot causes these duplicate reports to be more spread out because of the smaller extent of the memory map. The events were evenly spread across the board at a density of 1.30 to 1.60 errors/MiB. All errors in this memory were correctable. 
CONCLUSIONS
The mission design for LADEE ensured that it would encounter a challenging radiation environment with multiple crossings of the Van Allen Radiation belts and investigations of physical phenomena on the moon largely driven by solar and cosmic radiation. The spacecraft encountered multiple high-energy events, but the radiation tolerant design of the hardware components mitigated the effects, and the software design allowed for detailed categorization of events during the mission. The highest density of EDAC errors occurred during passage through the Van Allen Radiation belts, but uncorrectable multi-bit errors happened outside of this nearearth environment. The data from this mission does provide some guidance for baseline error rates for this avionics design. Under consideration for future software designs are code to do file system consistency checks and to fix any problems in the filesystem metadata that can be corrected.
